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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1206 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY LONDON, 
                              Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(No. 2-09-cr-00105-016) 
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 31, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 After Appellant Anthony London was convicted of a federal drug conspiracy 
charge, the District Court sentenced him to twenty years in prison because his prior 
California felony conviction qualified him for a mandatory sentence enhancement under 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  Now on appeal, London challenges the imposition of the 
sentence enhancement on two independent grounds.  First, he argues that the Government 
impermissibly sought the enhancement to coerce him into pleading guilty.  Second, he 
contends that the enhancement is no longer applicable because his prior California felony 
was recently reclassified as a misdemeanor.  We find neither of these arguments 
meritorious and will therefore affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 In March 2012, London was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846.  Normally, conviction for such an offense would carry a mandatory 
minimum of ten years in prison.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); id. § 846.  But after 
London pled not guilty, the Government filed an Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§ 851(a), alleging that he was instead subject to a mandatory minimum of twenty years 
due to his 1981 California felony conviction for possession of cocaine for sale, in 
violation of Section 11377 of the California Health and Safety Code.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A).   
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A jury ultimately convicted London of the federal conspiracy charge in January 
2014.  Prior to sentencing, London moved to strike the Information, alleging that the 
Government had committed prosecutorial misconduct by filing the Information with the 
intent to impermissibly coerce him into pleading guilty.  The District Court denied 
London’s motion and sentenced him to the enhanced mandatory minimum of twenty 
years in prison, followed by ten years of supervised release.  London then filed an appeal, 
reasserting the same argument from his motion to strike.   
 Meanwhile, in November 2014, California voters enacted Proposition 47—The 
Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act—which, among other things, allows individuals 
previously convicted of offenses under Section 11377 to petition for their felony 
convictions to be reclassified as misdemeanors.  See Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18(a).  
London filed such a petition, and following the docketing of his appeal, the petition was 
granted, and his conviction was reclassified.  We subsequently permitted London and the 
Government to submit supplemental briefing addressing whether the reclassification of 
London’s conviction as a misdemeanor impacts the validity of the sentence 
enhancement.1 
                                              
1 After the parties submitted their supplemental briefs, we decided to “hold the 
case C.A.V. pending the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. DeHoyos, 
S228230, or any other case that addressed the question of retroactivity of Proposition 
47.”  With the California Supreme Court having now decided DeHoyos, see 412 P.3d 368 
(2018), the matter is ripe for our disposition.   
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II. DISCUSSION2 
 Although we ordinarily remand cases when new facts arise, see, e.g., Madison Cty. 
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 562 U.S. 42, 43 (2011) (per curiam) (remanding for 
consideration of the impact of a “new factual development”), the reclassification of 
London’s prior offense raises a purely legal question involving statutory interpretation, 
over which we exercise plenary review, United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  The issue has been fully briefed, and “there is no controversy concerning the 
facts applicable.”  Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716, 730 (3d Cir. 1982).  Thus, 
“no purpose would be served by” remanding, and we think it appropriate to consider the 
question now, even though it was not, and could not, have been reached by the District 
Court in the first instance.  Id. 
 First, however, we address London’s original argument raised in the District 
Court—that the filing of the Information constituted prosecutorial misconduct because it 
was intended to coerce him into pleading guilty.  Because we find that initial argument 
unpersuasive, we then proceed to decide London’s reclassification argument, which we 
conclude lacks merit as well.  We will therefore affirm.   
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the District Court’s 
determinations of fact for clear error and exercise plenary review over its application of 
legal precepts.  United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 302–03 (3d Cir. 1992).   
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A. London’s Motion to Strike 
 London’s first argument is that the Information should have been struck because 
the Government impermissibly threatened to file it for the purpose of coercing him into a 
guilty plea.  According to London, when such effort to coerce failed, the Government 
carried out its threat to file as punishment for London’s exercise of his constitutional right 
to a trial by jury.  Acting with such intent to punish, London contends, violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
It is well-established that “prosecutorial vindictiveness” may constitute a due 
process violation, because “for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose 
objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently 
unconstitutional.’”  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (quoting Chaffin 
v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32–33 n.20 (1973)).  Normally, however, a criminal 
defendant must offer proof of “actual vindictiveness” in order to assert a due process 
claim.  See United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1992).  Only in the rare 
circumstances where “a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists” do we recognize a 
“presumption of vindictiveness,” which allows a defendant to bring a constitutional claim 
without offering any concrete proof of improper governmental motive.  Id.     
No such presumption applies in the context of plea bargaining.  “[B]y tolerating 
and encouraging the negotiation of pleas,” our system “has necessarily accepted as 
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at the 
 6 
 
bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right” to proceed to a jury trial.  
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.  In other words, “in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea 
bargaining, there is no . . . element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is 
free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”  Id. at 363.  Thus, absent proof of actual 
vindictiveness, no due process violation occurs when the prosecution does exactly what 
the Government supposedly attempted to do here: induce a guilty plea by threatening a 
greater penalty upon conviction after trial.  Id.  Because London has not offered any 
evidence of actual vindictiveness, his due process claim fails, and the District Court was 
correct to deny his motion to strike the Information.3     
B. The Reclassification of London’s California Conviction 
 London next argues that we should remand for resentencing because he is no 
longer eligible for the sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) in light of 
the reclassification of his California conviction as a misdemeanor.  Section 841(b)(1)(A) 
imposes a mandatory sentence of no less than twenty years in prison if a defendant 
                                              
3 In September 2014, after London had already filed his motion to strike, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued a Memorandum providing that a “§ 851 
enhancement should not be used in plea negotiations for the sole or predominant purpose 
of inducing a defendant to plead guilty.”  Memorandum from Attorney General Eric H. 
Holder, Jr. to Department of Justice Attorneys (September 24, 2014).  But DOJ policies 
“do not themselves create rights for criminal defendants.”  United States v. Christie, 624 
F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Accordingly, the September 2014 Memorandum provides London no basis for 
relief here.   
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“commits [a violation of § 841] after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has 
become final.”4  The interpretation of this provision is a matter of federal law, rather than 
state law.  See United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 183 (3d Cir. 1993) (addressing 
nearly identical language in § 841(b)(1)(B)).  Thus, in determining whether the 
reclassification of London’s prior conviction impacts his eligibility for the § 841(b)(1)(A) 
enhancement, we begin the same way we begin all inquiries involving statutory 
interpretation—with the text of the statutory provision.  Williams, 675 F.3d at 277–278.   
 On its face, the text of § 841(b)(1)(A) is “backward-looking.”  United States v. 
Diaz, 838 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 
821 (2011)).  It requires only that the defendant commit his federal offense after his prior 
conviction “has become final.”  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  The relevant inquiry, then, 
‘“is whether the defendant was previously convicted, not the particulars of how state law 
later might have’ permitted relief from the defendant’s state conviction.”  Diaz, 838 F.3d 
at 973–74 (quoting United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1293 (10th Cir. 2013)).  “In 
other words, a state making a change to a state conviction after it has become final ‘does 
not alter the historical fact of the [prior state] conviction’ becoming final.”  Id. at 973 
                                              
4 London was convicted of conspiracy to commit a violation of § 841 under 21 
U.S.C. § 846, which provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit 
any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subjected to the same penalties as those 
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or 
conspiracy.”   
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(alteration in original) (quoting Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1292).  That historical fact is the sole 
focus of § 841(b)(1)(A).   
 Consequently, we have held that there is no impact on § 841 eligibility when the 
defendant’s prior state conviction is outright dismissed following probation, which is a 
more drastic change than reclassification.  Meraz, 998 F.2d at 184; see also United States 
v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 349–51 (3d Cir. 1992) (treating defendant’s prior conviction 
as a felony for purposes of § 841 even though state later statutorily reduced underlying 
offense to a misdemeanor, without enacting any individualized reclassification process).  
Dismissal or expungement might be relevant for purposes of § 841 if the change alters 
the legality of the underlying prior conviction, like cases where there was trial error or the 
defendant was actually innocent.  See United States v. Norbury, 492 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  But other than those circumstances, the “federal enhancement ‘does not 
depend upon the mechanics of state post-conviction procedures, but rather involves the 
[state] conviction’s underlying lawfulness.’”  Diaz, 838 F.3d at 973 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Norbury, 492 F.3d at 1015)).   
 Such a regime may at first glance seem harsh, but there is good reason behind it.  
“Ignoring later state actions for purposes of federal sentences . . . aligns with the Supreme 
Court’s repeated admonishments that federal laws should be construed to achieve 
national uniformity.”  Id. at 974 (citing Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 
103, 112 (1983), superseded by statute, as recognized in Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 
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23, 27–28 (2007)).  If state post-conviction procedures always impacted eligibility under 
§ 841, the federal sentence enhancements would apply in an unfair, “patchwork” 
manner.5  Id. (quoting United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1979)); see 
also McGlory, 968 F.2d at 350 (noting “confusion . . . likely to result if . . . sentencing 
court[s] had to analyze the status of every prior state conviction in terms of the status of 
state law”).  The sentence enhancements in § 841 are also meant to combat recidivism.  
That purpose would not be served by affording a defendant relief from his federal 
sentence whenever a state provides him procedural relief related to a previous state 
conviction after he has already committed another federal drug offense.  Diaz, 838 F.3d 
at 974; Dyke, 718 F.3d at 1292–93.    
 Here, the decision of California voters to enact Proposition 47 does not change the 
fact that London committed his federal offense “after a prior conviction for a felony drug 
offense ha[d] become final.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  Because the subsequent 
reclassification of London’s California conviction had no bearing on that conviction’s 
underlying lawfulness, he remains eligible for the sentence enhancement he received 
under § 841(b)(1)(A).  See Diaz, 838 F.3d 975 (concluding that Proposition 47 “does not 
undermine a prior conviction’s felony-status for purposes of § 841”).   
                                              
5 Congress could, of course, give retroactive effect to forms of relief under state 
law that are unrelated to trial error or actual innocence, and it has done so in other 
contexts.  See, e.g., Logan, 552 U.S. at 27–28 (discussing amendment to Firearms 
Owners’ Protection Act that excludes from qualifying predicate offense status state 
convictions that have been expunged). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.   
